

Talk About Beliefs By Mark Crimmins

Thank you certainly much for downloading **talk about beliefs by mark crimmins**.Most likely you have knowledge that, people have see numerous times for their favorite books next this talk about beliefs by mark crimmins, but stop going on in harmful downloads.

Rather than enjoying a good book with a cup of coffee in the afternoon, otherwise they juggled behind some harmful virus inside their computer. **talk about beliefs by mark crimmins** is genial in our digital library an online entrance to it is set as public consequently you can download it instantly. Our digital library saves in multiple countries, allowing you to get the most less latency epoch to download any of our books later than this one. Merely said, the talk about beliefs by mark crimmins is universally compatible with any devices to read. Talk about Beliefs book. Read reviews from world's largest community for readers. Talk about Beliefs presents an account of beliefs and of practices of r... Crimmins connects issues in mental representation with semantic issues in language for talking about cognition to provide a theoretically fruitful account of belief and belief reports that is logically consistent with intuitive judgments of such notorious problems as Frege's puzzles about substitution and cognitive significance, Quine's puzzle about de re, Castaneda and Perry's ... Talk about beliefs by Crimmins, Mark. Publication date 1992 Topics Belief and doubt, Semantics (Philosophy), PHILOSOPHY -- Epistemology, Speculative Philosophy, Philosophy, Philosophy & Religion Publisher Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press Collection inlibrary; printdisabled; internetarchivebooks Crimmins connects issues in mental representation with semantic issues in language for talking about cognition to provide a theoretically fruitful account of belief and belief reports that is... Talk About Beliefs. Mark Crimmins. MIT Press (1992) Authors Mark Crimmins Stanford University ... Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs. Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63. Analytics. Added to PP index 2009-01-28 Total views 182 (#64,246 of 2,504,351) Recent downloads (6 months) Review of Mark Crimmins, Talk About Beliefs. AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1996. Richard Holton. Download Download PDF. Full PDF Package Download Full PDF Package. This Paper. A short summary of this paper. 37 Full PDFs related to this paper. Read Paper. Download Download PDF. The item Talk about beliefs, Mark Crimmins represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in University of Missouri-St. Louis Libraries. This item is available to borrow from

talk about beliefs by mark crimmins

- home
- my books
- browse ?
 - recommendations
 - choice awards
 - genres
 - giveaways
 - new releases
 - lists
 - explore
- genres news & interviews
 - art
 - biography
 - business
 - children's
 - christian
 - classics
 - comics
 - cookbooks
 - ebooks
 - fantasy
 - fiction
 - graphic novels
 - historical fiction
 - history
 - horror
 - memoir
 - music
 - mystery
 - nonfiction
 - poetry
 - psychology
 - romance
 - science
 - science fiction
 - self help
 - sports
 - thriller
 - travel
 - young adult
 - more genres
- community ?
 - groups
 - quotes
 - ask the author

- sign in
- join

sign upview profile

- profile
- friends
- groups
- discussions
- comments
- reading challenge
- kindle notes & highlights
- quotes
- favorite genres
- friends' recommendations
- account settings
- help
- sign out

- home
- my books
- browse ?
 - recommendations
 - choice awards
 - genres
 - giveaways
 - new releases
 - lists
 - explore
- genres news & interviews
 - art
 - biography
 - business
 - children's
 - christian
 - classics
 - comics
 - cookbooks
 - ebooks
 - fantasy
 - fiction
 - graphic novels
 - historical fiction
 - history
 - horror
 - memoir
 - music
 - mystery
 - nonfiction
 - poetry
 - psychology
 - romance
 - science
 - science fiction
 - self help
 - sports
 - thriller
 - travel
 - young adult
 - more genres
- community ?
 - groups
 - quotes
 - ask the author

goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. start by marking "talk about beliefs" as want to read: want to read saving...

- want to read
- currently reading
- read

other editions and try again. rate this book clear rating error of 5 stars2 of 5 stars3 of 5 stars4 of 5 stars5 of 5 stars open preview see a problem? we'd love your help. let us know what's wrong with this preview of talk about beliefs by mark crimmins. problem: it's the wrong book it's the wrong edition other details (if other): cancel

thanks for telling us about the problem.

return to book page not the book you're looking for? preview — talk about beliefs by mark crimmins talk about beliefs by mark crimmins liked it 3.00 · rating details · 4 ratings · 0 reviews talk about beliefs presents an account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of language and mind. crimmins connects issues in mental representation with semantic issues in language for talking about cognition to provide a theoretically fruitful account of belief and belief reports that is logically talk about beliefs presents an account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of language and mind. crimmins connects issues in mental representation with semantic issues in language for talking about cognition to provide a theoretically fruitful account of belief and belief reports that is logically consistent with intuitive judgements of such notorious problems as frege's puzzles about substitution and cognitive significance, quine's puzzle about de re, castaneda and perry's puzzle about indexical beliefs, and other more complicated variations. ...more get a copy

- amazon
- stores ?audible
- barnes & noble
- walmart ebooks
- google play
- abebooks
- book depository
- alibris
- indigo
- read world books
- indiebound
- thrifftbooks
- libraries

hardcover, 214 pages published june 19th 1992 by mit press (ma) isbn 026203185x original title: talk about beliefs (bradford books) isbn 9780585238265 (isbn13: 9780262031851) edition language english other editions (3)

-
-
-

all editions ...less detail edit details friend reviews to see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. reader q&a to ask other readers questions about talk about beliefs, please sign up.

be the first to ask a question about talk about beliefs

lists with this book this book is not yet featured on listopia. add this book to your favorite list » community reviews showing 1-7 liked it average rating 3.00 · rating details · 4 ratings · 0 reviews

all languages more filters | sort order start your review of talk about beliefswrite a review rodrigo jungmann rated it liked it dec 01, 2012 nathan cox rated it liked it jun 04, 2014 dean rated it liked it nov 27, 2008 stephen rated it liked it mar 11, 2012 estela marked it as to-read apr 30, 2009 k marked it as to-read jun 13, 2017 wiegerinck marked it as to-read oct 19, 2019 new topicdiscuss this book there are no discussion topics on this book yet. be the first to start one » share recommend it | stats | recent status updates about mark crimmins mark crimmins 2 followers books by mark crimmins more... news & interviews6 great books hitting shelves this week need another excuse to treat yourself to a new book this week? we've got you covered with the buzziest new releases of the day. to create our...read more...23 likes · 12 comments trivia about talk about beliefs no trivia or quizzes yet. add some now »

talk about beliefs - university of missouri-st. louis libraries

the resource talk about beliefs, mark crimmins talk about beliefs, mark crimmins resource information the item **talk about beliefs, mark crimmins** represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in **university of missouri-st. louis libraries**.this item is available to borrow from 1 library branch. creator

- crimmins, mark

language eng work publication

- cambridge, mass., mit press, ©1992

extent 1 online resource (xi, 214 pages) note "a bradford book." isbn 9780585238265 instance label talk about beliefs title talk about beliefs statement of responsibility mark crimmins creator

- crimmins, mark

subject

- belief and doubt
- electronic books
- philosophy -- epistemology
- philosophy
- belief and doubt
- semantics (philosophy)
- semantics (philosophy)
- speculative philosophy
- philosophy & religion

genre

- electronic books

language eng cataloging source n\$t library.link/vocab/creatorname crimmins, mark dewey number 121.6 illustrations illustrations index index present language note english lc call number bd215 lc item number .c825 1992eb literary form non fiction nature of contents

- dictionaries
- bibliography

library.link/vocab/subjectname

- belief and doubt
- semantics (philosophy)
- philosophy
- belief and doubt
- semantics (philosophy)
- speculative philosophy
- philosophy
- philosophy & religion

label talk about beliefs, mark crimmins instantiates

- talk about beliefs

publication

- cambridge, mass., mit press, ©1992

note "a bradford book." bibliography note includes bibliographical references (pages 207-212) and index carrier category online resource carrier category code

- cr

carrier marc source rdacarrier color multicolored content category text content type code

- txt

content type marc source rdacontent control code 44964333 dimensions unknown extent 1 online resource (xi, 214 pages) form of item online isbn 9780585238265 media category computer media marc source rdamedia media type code

- c

other physical details illustrations specific material designation remote system control number (oclc)44964333 label talk about beliefs, mark crimmins publication

- cambridge, mass., mit press, ©1992

note "a bradford book." bibliography note includes bibliographical references (pages 207-212) and index carrier category online resource carrier category code

- cr

carrier marc source rdacarrier color multicolored content category text content type code

- txt

content type marc source rdacontent control code 44964333 dimensions unknown extent 1 online resource (xi, 214 pages) form of item online isbn 9780585238265 media category computer media marc source rdamedia media type code

- c

other physical details illustrations specific material designation remote system control number (oclc)44964333 subject

- belief and doubt
- electronic books
- philosophy -- epistemology
- philosophy
- belief and doubt
- semantics (philosophy)
- semantics (philosophy)
- speculative philosophy
- philosophy & religion

genre

- electronic books

library locations

- map
- details
 - thomas jefferson libraryborrow it 1 university blvd, st. louis, mo, 63121, us 38.710138 -90.311107

library links

- ask a librarian
- library catalogs
- library services

embed settings select options that apply then copy and paste the rdf/html data fragment to include in your application embed this data in a secure (https) page: layout options: carousel grid list card include data citation: <div class="citation" vocab="schema.org"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> data from talk about beliefs, mark crimmins - university of missouri-st. louis libraries</div> note: adjust the width and height settings defined in the rdf/html code fragment to best match your requirements preview copy to clipboard close cite data - experimental data citation of the item talk about beliefs, mark crimmins copy and paste the following rdf/html data fragment to cite this resource <div class="citation" vocab="schema.org"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> data from talk about beliefs, mark crimmins - university of missouri-st. louis libraries</div> copy to clipboard close structured data from the bibframe namespace is licensed under the creative commons attribution 4.0 international license by university of missouri-st. louis libraries. additional terms may apply to data associated with third party namespaces. processing feedback ...

(pdf) review of mark crimmins, talk about beliefs | richard holton - academia.edu

xclosetolog inlog in with facebook log in with google oremailpasswordremember me on this computer or reset password

enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

need an account? click here to sign up log in sign up

- log in
• sign up
• more
◦ job board
◦ about
◦ press
◦ blog
◦ people
◦ papers
◦ terms
◦ privacy
◦ copyright
◦ we're hiring!
◦ help center
◦ less

download free pdfdownload free pdf free pdfreview of mark crimmins, talk about beliefsaustralasian journal of philosophy, 1996richard holtondownload pdfdownload pdf packagepdf packdownloadpdf packread paperoriginal pdfplain text

it is an apparent feature of propositional attitude ascriptions that the complement sentences they contain are opaque: that is, the substitution of coreferential terms within the complement sentence will not always preserve the truth value of the whole ascription. by and large, theorists of propositional attitudes ascriptions have understood an important part of their task to be to account for this opacity ('by and large' since in recent years a number of theorists have denied that the apparent opacity is genuine). accounts of opacity have fallen into three broad classes. in the first come those that deny that the terms within the complement sentence have their usual reference; in davidson's phrase, these accounts abandon their semantic innocence. in this class comes frege's account, an account which sees the terms in the complement clause as referring to what is customarily their sense; here too come the various sentential accounts, accounts which see the terms as referring to themselves. in the second broad class come what we might call 'intentional operator' theories. these hold that the terms maintain their customary reference, but that in addition they bring with them a further semantic value, a sense or an intention of some kind. the complement sentence is then understood as falling within the scope of an intentional operator which is sensitive to these further semantic values, in such a way that the truth value of the whole ascription can be affected when they change. the price paid by such accounts is the need to invoke an intensional logic, in addition to whatever intensional semantic values are needed for the logic to operate on. in the third class come theories that trace the opacity to the reference of some part of the sentence other than the complement sentence. an example is davidson's account of the related phenomenon of indirect speech ascriptions, an account which treats the complementizer 'that' as a demonstrative denoting the utterance of the complement sentence. words in the complement sentence retain their ordinary reference; however, substituting a co-referential term within the complement can affect the truth value of the whole report, since the demonstrative comes to denote a different utterance.

in this important and stimulating book, mark crimmins has given us a variant of the third kind of account. developing ideas first put forward in a joint article with john perry, he argues that belief reports express propositions that contain unarticulated constituents. substituting coreferential terms within the complement sentence does not change the semantic value of that sentence; however it can change the truth value of the whole report, since it can change these unarticulated constituents. to see how this works it is helpful to start with crimmins' discussion of quine's famous example giorgione was so called because of his size.

clearly here the term 'giorgione' refers to giorgione; but equally clearly, substituting the coreferential term 'barbarelli' changes the truth value of the sentence. crimmins suggests that 'so' functions as a demonstrative denoting a name, so that (1) can be paraphrased as

(2) giorgione was called that because of his size.

crimmins points out that whilst in a typical use of (1) 'so' will refer to the name 'giorgione' that is used earlier in the sentence, in the right context it need not. consider the (false!) sentences

(3)

both giorgione and titian were known as 'the giant'. giorgione was so-called because of his size; in titian's case it was his towering skill that gave rise to the name.

here 'so' is naturally taken as referring to the name 'the giant' which is mentioned in the previous sentence; it seems that it can refer to any name that is made contextually salient (which is what we would expect of a demonstrative). crimmins' idea is that belief reports have much in common with sentences containing 'so-called': however, in a belief report the element that would do the work of 'so-called' does not appear in the surface structure. in essence (and much simplified), his proposal is that a report of the form judith believes that giorgione was a painter can be understood as expressing the same proposition as is expressed by (5) judith believes that giorgione was a painter by means of that notion and that idea where the notion in question is a representation of the individual giorgione and the idea is a representation of the property of being a painter. this gives rise to opacity in the following way. suppose judith has two notions of the individual giorgione, one of which includes the feature that he is called 'giorgione' whilst the other includes the feature that he is called 'barbarelli'. let us further suppose that she believes the first of these notions (her giorgione-notion) to concern an italian landscape painter; and that she believes the second (her barbarellinotion) to concern an english conductor. one of these notions will be denoted by the expression 'that notion' in (5). which one? that will depend on which of them is made salient by the context; as with 'so-called' there is no simple rule which determines this. however, again paralleling the case of 'so-called', a typical way of making a representation salient will be by means of the very words used in the ascription. so typically (5) will be used to ascribe to judith the belief that the person denoted by her giorgione-notion has the property of being a painter (i have described this belief meta-linguistically, but this can be avoided). now we can see how this gives rise to opacity. suppose we substituted 'barbarelli' for 'giorgione' in (5).

the name would still function to denote the same person. however, typically the denotation of 'that notion' would change. rather than denoting judith's giorgione-notion, it will now typically denote her barbarelli-notion. i have stressed the structural similarity of this account to davidson's account of indirect discourse. in both cases semantic innocence is maintained, and an intensional logic is avoided, by invoking a further constituent which can change when coreferential substitutions are made in the complement sentence. however there are two important differences. in the first place, davidson claims that the further constituent is explicitly denoted by a term occurring in the surface structure of the belief ascription: it is the complementizer 'that' (or at least, this is how davidson initially presents the idea in 'on saying that'; later in the article the logical form of belief ascriptions is given in a way that makes no such claim). crimmins, in contrast, thinks that the further constituents are unarticulated. he remains undecided whether to think of them as denoted by covert terms which are somehow suppressed at surface structure; or whether in contrast to think of them as not really being denoted at all, but as simply determined in a context by their salience.

crimmins, mark, talk about beliefs (cambridge ma: mit press, 1992) pp. xi, 214 us\$25 (cloth). it is an apparent feature of propositional attitude ascriptions that the complement sentences they contain are opaque: that is, the substitution of coreferential terms within the complement sentence will not always preserve the truth value of the whole ascription. by and large, theorists of propositional attitudes ascriptions have understood an important part of their task to be to account for this opacity ('by and large' since in recent years a number of theorists have denied that the apparent opacity is genuine). accounts of opacity have fallen into three broad classes. in the first come those that deny that the terms within the complement sentence have their usual reference; in davidson's phrase, these accounts abandon their semantic innocence. in this class comes frege's account, an account which sees the terms in the complement clause as referring to what is customarily their sense; here too come the various sentential accounts, accounts which see the terms as referring to themselves. in the second broad class come what we might call 'intentional operator' theories. these hold that the terms maintain their customary reference, but that in addition they bring with them a further semantic value, a sense or an intention of some kind. the complement sentence is then understood as falling within the scope of an intentional operator which is sensitive to these further semantic values, in such a way that the truth value of the whole ascription can be affected when they change. the price paid by such accounts is the need to invoke an intensional logic, in addition to whatever intensional semantic values are needed for the logic to operate on. in the third class come theories that trace the opacity to the reference of some part of the sentence other than the complement sentence. an example is davidson's account of the related phenomenon of indirect speech ascriptions, an account which treats the complementizer 'that' as a demonstrative denoting the utterance of the complement sentence. words in the complement sentence retain their ordinary reference; however, substituting a co-referential term within the complement can affect the truth value of the whole report, since the demonstrative comes to denote a different utterance. in this important and stimulating book, mark crimmins has given us a variant of the third kind of account. developing ideas first put forward in a joint article with john perry, he argues that belief reports express propositions that contain unarticulated constituents. substituting coreferential terms within the complement sentence does not change the semantic value of that sentence; however it can change the truth value of the whole report, since it can change these unarticulated constituents. to see how this works it is helpful to start with crimmins' discussion of quine's famous example (1) giorgione was so called because of his size. clearly here the term 'giorgione' refers to giorgione; but equally clearly, substituting the coreferential term 'barbarelli' changes the truth value of the sentence. crimmins suggests that 'so' functions as a demonstrative denoting a name, so that (1) can be paraphrased as (2) giorgione was called that because of his size. crimmins points out that whilst in a typical use of (1) 'so' will refer to the name 'giorgione' that is used earlier in the sentence, in the right context it need not. consider the (false!) sentences (3) both giorgione and titian were known as 'the giant'. giorgione was so-called because of his size; in titian's case it was his towering skill that gave rise to the name. here 'so' is naturally taken as referring to the name 'the giant' which is mentioned in the previous sentence; it seems that it can refer to any name that is made contextually salient (which is what we would expect of a demonstrative). crimmins' idea is that belief reports have much in common with sentences containing 'so-called': however, in a belief report the element that would do the work of 'so-called' does not appear in the surface structure. in essence (and much simplified), his proposal is that a report of the form (4) judith believes that giorgione was a painter can be understood as expressing the same proposition as is expressed by (5) judith believes that giorgione was a painter by means of that notion and that idea where the notion in question is a representation of the individual giorgione and the idea is a representation of the property of being a painter. this gives rise to opacity in the following way. suppose judith has two notions of the individual giorgione, one of which includes the feature that he is called 'giorgione' whilst the other includes the feature that he is called 'barbarelli'. let us further suppose that she believes the first of these notions (her giorgione- notion) to concern an italian landscape painter; and that she believes the second (her barbarelli- notion) to concern an english conductor. one of these notions will be denoted by the expression 'that notion' in (5). which one? that will depend on which of them is made salient by the context; as with 'so-called' there is no simple rule which determines this. however, again paralleling the case of 'so-called', a typical way of making a representation salient will be by means of the very words used in the ascription. so typically (5) will be used to ascribe to judith the belief that the person denoted by her giorgione-notion has the property of being a painter (i have described this belief meta-linguistically, but this can be avoided). now we can see how this gives rise to opacity. suppose we substituted 'barbarelli' for 'giorgione' in (5). the name would still function to denote the same person. however, typically the denotation of 'that notion' would change. rather than denoting judith's giorgione-notion, it will now typically denote her barbarelli-notion. i have stressed the structural similarity of this account to davidson's account of indirect discourse. in both cases semantic innocence is maintained, and an intensional logic is avoided, by invoking a further constituent which can change when coreferential substitutions are made in the complement sentence. however there are two important differences. in the first place, davidson claims that the further constituent is explicitly denoted by a term occurring in the surface structure of the belief ascription: it is the complementizer 'that' (or at least, this is how davidson initially presents the idea in 'on saying that'; later in the article the logical form of belief ascriptions is given in a way that makes no such claim). crimmins, in contrast, thinks that the further constituents are unarticulated. he remains undecided whether to think of them as denoted by covert terms which are somehow suppressed at surface structure; or whether in contrast to think of them as not really being denoted at all, but as simply determined in a context by their salience. the second difference from davidson concerns the nature of the unarticulated constituents. in davidson's account of speech ascriptions, these are utterances. for crimmins, notions, ideas, and beliefs are concrete mental entities, things that come into existence at a particular time for a particular thinker. crimmins spends a considerable amount of time defending the idea that belief ascriptions can be better explained by a theory that embraces such concrete entities than by one that embraces abstract entities or belief states (amongst which he includes senses, classes of possible worlds, and functional states) that can be grasped or instantiated by different thinkers. the basic idea is that once abstract entities become fine grained enough to individuate beliefs, they become too fine grained to be shared. all of what crimmins says against the abstract conception is interesting, and much is convincing. however, the position that he adopts does appear to leave him a hostage to empirical fortune: it is not at all clear that neuro-science will ultimately recognize the existence of the concrete particulars to which his account is committed. crimmins recognizes a worry here, and argues that the commitments are at least 'prima facie plausible' (p. 75). however, the real worry is not that his account is hostage to fortune in this way; it is rather that it seems most implausible that our common practice of belief ascriptions is similarly hostage. the account risks saddling the analysis of belief ascriptions with commitments that are not there in the ascriptions themselves. crimmins has something to say to lessen the force of these commitments: he argues that the concrete entities he is concerned with need not be simply 'chunks of grey matter'; and he points to 'knots, waves, utterances, epidemics, and traditions' as examples of entities that are not simply 'masses of stuff', yet are nonetheless not abstract (p. 54). yet now a worry arises over whether these really should be thought of as concrete objects; mightn't they rather be instances of just the sorts of abstract states that he has been at pains to disavow in the case of thoughts? it strikes me that crimmins should not be so ready to conclude that just because such abstract entities cannot always individuate our belief states, they cannot be the objects that our ordinary practice of belief ascriptions invokes; for it strikes me that our ordinary practice of belief ascriptions breaks down in the face of cases where very fine grained individuation is called for (for instance, in paderewski cases). there much more that crimmins can say here in defence of his account; and a great deal of it is said in the book. however, it is a great advantage of the account that the so much of it remains independent of the resolution of these issues. in articulating in some detail a semantics for an account of propositional attitude ascriptions using unarticulated constituents, crimmins has presented something that can be used by those who disagree with him over the exact nature of those constituents. the book is a major contribution to the literature on attitude ascriptions. richard holton monash university related paperspropositional attitudes (2006)by kasia jaszczoltdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfascritions with an attitude. a study on belief reportsby nefelí villanuevdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfmarcus and substitutivityby graeme forbesdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdffrom giorgione-sentences to simple sentencesby eros corazzadownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfquasi-singular propositions: the semantics of belief reportsby francois recanatidownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfintensional verbs in event semanticsby graeme forbesdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfthe indispensability of sinn author (s)by graeme forbesdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfpropositional attitude reports: pragmatic aspects (2012)by kasia jaszczoltdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdffictional sentences, negation and adverbsby tomás andrés barrero guzmádownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfsubstitutivity and side effectsby graeme forbesdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfmental files, blown up by indexed filesby nefelí villanueva and isidora stojanovicdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfprely to marksby graeme forbesdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfis it merely loose talk? a 'bizarre' solution to the opacity puzzleby alberto voltolinidownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdflanguage philosophy 1. must do better – timothy williamsonby james macavoydownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfessential indexicals and quasi-indicatorsby eros corazzadownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfwittgenstein y la intencionalidad de lo mentalby nefelí villanuevdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfroles, rigidity, and quantification in epistemic logicby wesley holliday and john perrydownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfcontextualism and minimalism on de se belief ascription (2013)by kasia jaszczoltdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfcontext-dependence, perspective and relativity in language and thoughtby nefelí villanuevdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfcontext-dependence, perspective and relativityby isidora stojanovicdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdffenny clapp davidson's program and interpreted logical formsby lenny clappdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfdavidson's program and interpreted logical formsby lenny clappdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdflifting the church-ban on quotational analysis: the translation argument and the use-mention distinctionby peter sas and diederik oldersdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfembedding explicatures in implicit indirect reports: simple sentences, and substitution failure casesby alessandro caponedownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfdeferential concepts and opacityby nefelí villanuevdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfembedding explicatures in implicit indirect reports: simple sentences, and substitution failure cases. (from the monograph the pragmatics of indirect reports, 2016, springer).by alessandro caponedownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfunarticulated tensionby lenny clappdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfsingular content and de jure coreference (ma dissertation)by matheus valentendownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfwhy semantic innocence?by graham oppydownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfsingular thoughts and de re attitude reportsby james openshawdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfprécis of 'oratio obliqua, oratio recta': an essay on metarepresentation"by francois recanatidownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfbook symposium "oratio obliqua, oratio recta"by francois recanatidownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfkeeping a happy face on exportation - 1993by tomis kapitandownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfinterpreted logical formsby michelle montaguendownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfempty singular terms in the mental-file frameworkby francois recanatidownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfattitude reports: do you mind the gap?by berit brogaarddownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdftruthmaker-based content: syntactic, semantic, and ontological contexts. (theoretical 2021; 47(1–2): 155–187)by friederike moltmandownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdftransparent quantification into hyperpropositional attitudes de dicto ? to appear in linguistics and philosophyby bjørn jespersen and marie dužídownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfthat"-clauses as existential quantifiersby francois recanatidownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfcharacter study: a de se semantics for indexicalsby craige robertsdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfvariadic function and pragmatics-rich representations of belief reports (2007)by kasia jaszczoltdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfdavidson's semantics and rationality as constitutive ideal: a defence against the objection from chalmers' puzzle. by peter lanceleydownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfthe prince and the phone booth: reporting puzzling beliefsby john perrydownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfindexicality, 1989by adriano paolo shaul gershom palmadownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfliberating contentby ernie leporedownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfindexicalityby adriano paolo shaul gershom palmadownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfdoes semantic relationism solve frege's puzzle?by brian rabern and bryan pickelldownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfthe beliefs of mute animalsby simone gozzanodownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfgerhard preyer, the power of insensitive semantics now way out of the schism (2015)by gerhard preyerdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfreference and indexicality: phd thesisby erich rasdownload free pdfdownload pdfdownload free pdfview pdfpackdownload pdf package translatedownload pdf pack

- about

Access PDF Talk About Beliefs By Mark Crimmins

- press
 - blog
 - people
 - papers
 - topics
 - job board
 - we're hiring!
 - help center
-
- find new research papers in:
 - physics
 - chemistry
 - biology
 - health sciences
 - ecology
 - earth sciences
 - cognitive science
 - mathematics
 - computer science
-
- terms
 - privacy
 - copyright
 - academia ©2022

talk about beliefs - mark crimmins - google books

1. search
2. images
3. maps
4. play
5. youtube
6. news
7. gmail
8. drive
9. more

1. calendar
2. translate
3. mobile
4. books
5. shopping
6. blogger
7. finance
8. photos
9. videos
10. docs
- 11.
12. even more »

account options

1. sign in
- 2.

bookstry the new google bookscheck out the new look and enjoy easier access to your favorite featuristry it nowno thankstry the new google books

1. try the new google books
2. my library
3. help
4. advanced book search

get print book

no ebook available

- amazon.com
- barnes&noble.com
- books-a-million
- indiebound

- find in a library
- all sellers »

get textbooks on google play

rent and save from the world's largest ebookstore. read, highlight, and take notes, across web, tablet, and phone.

go to google play now »

talk about beliefsmark crimminsmit press, 1992 - psychology - 214 pages 0 reviewsreviews aren't verified, but google checks for and removes fake content when it's identified

talk about beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of language and mind. crimmins connects issues in mental representation with semantic issues in language for talking about cognition to provide a theoretically fruitful account of belief and belief reports that is logically consistent with intuitive judgments of such notorious problems as frege's puzzles about substitution and cognitive significance, quine's puzzle about de re, castaneda and perry's puzzle about indexical beliefs, and other more complicated variations.crimmins's account relies on, and to some extent vindicates, the traditions of representationalism in the philosophy of mind and of structured propositional semantics. in reporting a person's beliefs, crimmins argues, we systematically make claims not only about the propositional content of the beliefs but also about cognitive representations. he elaborates and defends this proposal by providing a careful assessment of pragmatic and semantic contributions to the claims expressed in belief reports.crimmins's thesis forms a promising framework within which to approach such issues in the philosophy of mind as tacit belief (do you believe that pencils do not eat?), criteria for having concepts (do blind persons have the concept of red?), and restrictions of acquaintance on objects of thought (can you believe something about the first person born in the next century?).mark crimmins is assistant professor in the department of philosophy at cornell university.

what people are saying - write a reviewwe haven't found any reviews in the usual places.other editions - view alltalk about beliefs

mark crimmins

limited preview - 1992

about the author (1992)

mark crimmins is assistant professor in the department of philosophy at cornell university.

bibliographic informationtitletalk about beliefs

*a bradford book*authormark crimminspublishermit press, 1992isbn0262515717, 9780262515719length214 pagessubjectspscychology › cognitive psychology & cognition

psychology / cognitive psychology & cognition sp nbsp;nbsp;export

citationbittext endnote refmanabout google books - privacy policy - terms of service - information for publishers - report an issue - help - google home

mark crimmins, talk about beliefs - philpapers

sign in | create an account **philpapers** philpeople philarchive philerevents philjobs

- syntax
- advanced search

- new
 - all new items
 - books
 - journal articles
 - manuscripts
- topics
 - all categories
 - metaphysics and epistemology
 - metaphysics and epistemology
 - epistemology
 - metaphilosophy
 - metaphysics
 - philosophy of action
 - philosophy of language
 - philosophy of mind
 - philosophy of religion
 - m&e, misc
 - value theory
 - value theory
 - aesthetics
 - applied ethics
 - meta-ethics
 - normative ethics
 - philosophy of gender, race, and sexuality
 - philosophy of law
 - social and political philosophy
 - value theory, miscellaneous
 - science, logic, and mathematics
 - science, logic, and mathematics
 - logic and philosophy of logic
 - philosophy of biology
 - philosophy of cognitive science
 - philosophy of computing and information
 - philosophy of mathematics
 - philosophy of physical science
 - philosophy of social science
 - philosophy of probability
 - general philosophy of science
 - philosophy of science, misc
 - history of western philosophy
 - history of western philosophy
 - ancient greek and roman philosophy
 - medieval and renaissance philosophy
 - 17th/18th century philosophy
 - 19th century philosophy
 - 20th century philosophy
 - history of western philosophy, misc
 - philosophical traditions
 - philosophical traditions
 - african/africana philosophy
 - asian philosophy
 - continental philosophy
 - european philosophy
 - philosophy of the americas
 - philosophical traditions, miscellaneous
 - philosophy, misc
 - philosophy, misc
 - philosophy, introductions and anthologies
 - philosophy, general works
 - teaching philosophy
 - philosophy, miscellaneous
 - other academic areas
 - other academic areas
 - natural sciences
 - social sciences
 - cognitive sciences
 - formal sciences
 - arts and humanities
 - professional areas
 - other academic areas, misc
 -
- journals
- submit material
 - submit a book or article
 - upload a bibliography
 - personal pages we track
 - archives we track
 - information for publishers
- more
 - introduction
 - submitting to philpapers
 - frequently asked questions
 - subscriptions
 - editor's guide
 - the categorization project
 - for publishers
 - for academic admins
 - contact us
 - philpapers surveys
 - api
 - bargain finder
 - about philpapers

- syntax
- advanced search

- sign in
- create an account

-
- syntax
- advanced search

talk about beliefs mark crimmins mit press (1992) authors mark crimmins stanford university abstract talk about beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of... keywords belief cognition epistemology language logic mind pragmatism puzzle semantics theory thought categories attitude ascriptions, misc in philosophy of language hidden-indexical theories of attitude ascriptions in philosophy of language language singular propositions in philosophy of language (categorize this paper) reprint years 1992 buy this book \$4.77 used (88% off) amazon page isbn(s) 9780262031851 0262515717 026203185x doi 10.2307/2219867 options edit this record mark as duplicate export citation history it on scholar request removal from index revision history download options philarchive copy

upload a copy of this paper check publisher's policy papers currently archived: 70,919 external links

- google books (no proxy)
- from the publisher via crossref (no proxy)
- pq.oxfordjournals.org (no proxy)
- jstor.org (no proxy)

setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your university's proxy server

configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy) through your library

- sign in / register and customize your openurl resolver..
- configure custom resolver

references found in this work beta

no references found.

add more references citations of this work beta mental files.françois recanati - 2012 - oxford university press.context and logical form.jason stanley - 2000 - linguistics and philosophy 23 (4):391--434.propositions and attitude ascriptions: a fregean account.david j. chalmers - 2011 - noûs 45 (4):595-639.the components of content.david chalmers - 2002 - in david j. chalmers (ed.), philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings. oxford university press.unarticulated constituents.françois recanati - 2002 - linguistics and philosophy 25 (3):299-345.

view all 148 citations / add more citations similar books and articles a formal model of multi-agent belief-interaction.john cantwell - 2006 - journal of logic, language and interaction 15 (4):397-422.intuitive and reflective beliefs.dan sperber - 1997 - mind and language 12 (1):67-83.discourse, beliefs and intentions: semantic defaults and propositional attitude ascription.katarzyna jaszczolt - 1999 - elsevier.animal belief.roger fellows - 2000 - philosophy 75 (294):587-599.my beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic.hans van ditmarsch & willem labuschagne - 2007 - synthese 155 (2):191-209.my beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic.hans van ditmarsch & willem labuschagne - 2007 - synthese 155 (2):191 - 209.tactitness and virtual beliefs.mark crimmins - 1992 - mind and language 7 (3):240-63.cantalytics **added to pp index** 2009-01-28

total views

182 (#65,060 of 2,512,695)

recent downloads (6 months)

2 (#274,541 of 2,512,695)

how can i increase my downloads? **downloads** my notes sign in to use this feature about us editorial team general editors: david bourget (western ontario) david chalmers (anu, nyu)

area editors:

- david bourget
- gwen bradford
- berit brogaard
- margaret cameron
- david chalmers
- james chase
- rafael de clercq
- ezio di nucci
- barry hallen
- hans halverson
- jonathan ichikawa
- michelle kosch
- Øystein linnebo
- jeeloo liu
- paul livingston
- brandon look
- manolo martínez
- matthew mcgrath
- michiru nagatsu
- susana nuccetelli
- giuseppe primiero
- jack alan reynolds
- darrell p. rowbottom
- aleksandra samonek
- constantine sandis
- howard sankey
- jonathan schaffer
- thomas senor
- robin smith
- daniel star
- jussi suikkanen
- lynnie tirrell
- aness kim webster

other editors:

contact us

learn more about philpapers

loading .. applied ethicsepistemologyhistory of western philosophymeta-ethicsmetaphysicsnormative ethicsphilosophy of biologyphilosophy of languagephilosophy of mindphilosophy of religionscience logic and mathematicsmore ... home | new books and articles | bibliographies | philosophy journals | discussions | article index | about philpapers | api | contact us | code of conduct

philpapers logo by andrea andrews and megan driscoll. this site uses cookies and google analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).

use of this site is subject to terms & conditions. all rights reserved by the philpapers foundation

server: philpapers-web-56ff6f9b5c-1nglh n

talk about beliefs : crimmins, mark : free download, borrow, and streaming : internet archive

books: talk about beliefs by mark crimmins (9780262515719), download ebook

books.org > nonfiction > philosophy > linguistics & semiotics **discover free books that you'll love!** receive unbeatable ebook deals in your favorite fiction or non-fiction genres. our daily emails are packed with new and bestselling authors you will love!

talk about beliefs by mark crimminspublisher: mit press pages: 230 paperback isbn: 9780262515719

available to buy overview of *talk about beliefs*

talk about beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of language and mind.

crimmins connects issues in mental representation with semantic issues in language for talking about cognition to provide a theoretically fruitful account of belief and belief reports that is logically consistent with intuitive judgments of such notorious problems as frege's puzzles about substitution and cognitive significance, quine's puzzle about de re, castaneda and perry's puzzle about indexical beliefs, and other more complicated variations.crimmins's account relies on, and to some extent vindicates, the traditions of representationalism in the philosophy of mind and of structured propositional semantics. in reporting a person's beliefs, crimmins argues, we systematically make claims not only about the propositional content of the beliefs but also about cognitive representations. he elaborates and defends this proposal by providing a careful assessment of pragmatic and semantic contributions to the claims expressed in belief reports.crimmins's thesis forms a promising framework within which to approach such issues in the philosophy of mind as tacit belief (do you believe that pencils do not eat?), criteria for having concepts (do blind persons have the concept of red?), and restrictions of acquaintance on objects of thought (can you believe something

Access PDF Talk About Beliefs By Mark Crimmins

about the first person born in the next century?).mark crimmins is assistant professor in the department of philosophy at cornell university.

synopsis of *talk about beliefs*

talk about beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of language and mind.

reviews of *talk about beliefs* there are no reviews yet. perhaps you can add one! topics nonfictionphilosophylinguistics & semioticsmajor branches of philosophical studyphilosophylinguistics & semioticssemanticsself improvementpersonal growthcharacteristics & qualities - self - improvementsee allself - improvement more books in this genre tense and aspect: from semantics to morphosyntax by alessandra giorgi, fabio pianesi meaning and saying: essays in the philosophy of language by frank b. ebersole a comparative study of the bantu and semi-bantu languages by harry hamilton johnston modern grammars of case by john m. anderson chinese perspectives in rhetoric and communication, vol. 1 by d. ray heisey trends in cognitive linguistics: theoretical and applied models by javier valenzuela (editor), ana rojo semantics and cognition by ray s. jackendoff on the syntactic composition of manner and motion by maria luisa zubizarreta, eunjeong oh discourse and identity by anna de fina (editor), deborah schiffrin (editor), michael bamberg language acquisition and development: studies of learners of first and other languages by brian tomlinson lexico-logical form by michael brody phonology of pennsylvania german english as evidence of language maintenance and shift by achim kopp sections

- details
- overview
- synopsis
- topics
- books.org reviews

available to buy follow us browse books by subject fiction books

& literature

graphic novels

horror

mystery & crime

poetry

romance books

science fiction & fantasy

thrillers

westerns

ages 0-2

ages 3-5

ages 6-8

ages 9-12

teens

african americans

antiques & collectibles

art, architecture & photography

bibles & bible studies

biography

business books

christianity

computer books & technology books

cookbooks, food & wine

crafts & hobbies books

education & teaching

engineering

entertainment

foreign languages

game books

gay & lesbian

health books, diet & fitness books

history

home & garden

humor books

judaism & judaica

law

medical books

new age & spirituality

nonfiction

parenting & family

pets

philosophy

political books & current events books

psychology & psychotherapy

reference

religion books

science & nature

self improvement

sex & relationships

social sciences

sports & adventure

study guides & test prep

travel

true crime

weddings

women's studies

links books.org blog

green books

books by author

book fairs & events

popular subjects ecology & environmental sciences

sci fi classics

business life & skills

graphic novels & comic books

teen fiction

© copyright 2022, books.org information about books.org

staff & visitor safety

the books.org scholarship

contact us

terms & conditions

privacy policy

xml schema